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1. The Ambiguity of Bare Plurals
It is well known that English sentences containing bare plurals (henceforth BPs)
are ambiguous. Under one reading, they can be interpreted as a predication of
some property directly of a kind, as in (1a), which says that the kind dog is extinct.
Alternatively, they can express some characterizing property of instances of a kind,
as in (1b), which says that, in general, individual dogs are intelligent. Yet a third
reading is existential,as in (1c), which says that somedogs are barking outsideright
now.
(1) a. Dogs are extinct.
b. Dogs are intelligent.
c. Dogs are barking outside right now.
An important question to consider is the denotation of BPs in each one of
these readings: is every reading associated with a different denotationof the BP? Or
do BPs retain a uniform denotation, and the source of the ambiguity lies elsewhere?
Or perhaps some combination of the above is correct, where BPs have the same
denotation under two readings, but a different denotation under the third one?
The ﬁrst two options appear to be the most elegant. Yet, in this paper I argue
for the third option, on both empirical and theoretical grounds. The organization of
this paper is as follows. In the following section I will present two inﬂuential theo-
ries of type-shifting, which make heavy use of type-shifting: Chierchia (1998) and
Krifka (2004). Section 3 will focus on the differences between these two theories
regarding the denotations of BPs in generic and existential sentences. In Section 4 I
propose a an approach which I consider to be a synthesis of the best in Chierchia’s
and Krifka’s theories. Section 5 turns to Italian in order to ﬁnd support for the pro-
posed theory, and putative counterexamples are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 is
a brief conclusion.
I would like to thank Chris Barker, Gennaro Chierchia, and Louise McNally for helpful
discussions.
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2.1. Points of Agreement
TwoinﬂuentialtheoriesofBPs (Chierchia1998, Krifka2004)employtype-shifting.
Whilethetwotheoriesaredifferent(and wewillget tothedifferences inamoment),
they share many points of agreement, of which I will list six.
The ﬁrst three points of agreement have to do with the nature of type-
shifting:
1. Type-Shifting Operators. Chierchia and Krifka agree on the basic inventory of
type-shifting operators. In particular, the following operators will be relevant to the
current paper.
Oneistheexistentialtype-shift,whosedeﬁnitiongoesbacktoPartee(1987):
(2) ∃P = λQ ∃x(P(x)∧Q(x))
Another is ι, which corresponds to the deﬁnite determiner in English:
(3) ιP = the maximal element in P (where deﬁned)
This deﬁnition has the effect that if P is a singular property, say DOG, ιP picks the
unique element that satisﬁes it (if there is such an element), i.e. the unique dog in
context. And if P is a plural property, e.g. DOGS, ιP is the largest plurality of P,
i.e. the plurality of all dogs.
Twoadditionaloperatorsare the ∩ and the ∪ operators, whichturnaproperty
into a kind and vice versa, respectively. Chierchia and Krifka treat the kind ∩P as
a function that produces, for each world, the maximal plurality of Psi nt h a tw o r l d .
Formally, the ∩ operator is deﬁned as follows:
(4) ∩P = λs ιPs (where deﬁned).1
The operator that turns a kind into a property is the ∪ operator. It returns a
function that, for each world, returns the property of being a part of the plurality
that comprises all the atomic elements of the kind. Formally:
(5) ∪k = λs.λx.x ≤ ks
Thus, for example, if d is the kind dog,t h e n∪d is the property of being an element
of the maximal plurality of dogs, i.e. the property of being a dog.
2. The last resort principle. Both Chierchia and Krifka follow Partee and Rooth
(1983) in assuming that type-shifting does not occur freely, but only if it is necessi-
tated by type mismatch.
3. The blocking principle. Type-shifting is blocked if a language can achieve the
same effect by overt means. That is to say, in language L there is no type-shifting
operator τ if L contains an overt operator D s.t. for every argument X, D(x)=τ(X).
1Not every property can be turned into a kind, hence ∩P is not deﬁned for every P; but I will not
get here into the conditions that make ∩P well deﬁned.
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4. BPs are basically properties. That is to say, their initial denotation, before type-
shifting, is that of a property. The ∩ operator can apply to shift this property to a
kind. Indeed, this is what happens in cases of direct kind predication, as in (1a).
So, according to both Chierchia and Krifka, BPs in direct kind predication (after
type-shifting) denote kinds.
5. The Generic Quantiﬁer. Chierchia and Krifka share the widely held assumption
that characterizing generic readings involve a phonologically null generic quanti-
ﬁer. The precise truth conditions of this quantiﬁer do not concern us here, but its
meaning can be glossed, somewhat inaccurately, as “in general”.2
6. Existential readings. Existential readings of BPs are provided by type shifting.3
It is well established that existential BPs are restricted to narrow scope only.
Thus, (6a) can mean (6b) but not (6c).
(6) a. I didn’t meet beautiful girls
b. It is false that there exist beautiful girls whom I met.
c. There exist beautiful girls whom I didn’t meet.
Chierchia and Krifka explain this fact by assuming that type shifting is local. As
Krifka puts it: “if we follow Chierchia and assume that type shifting occurs as late,
or as locally, as possible,...typeshifting predicts that bare NPs have narrow scope.”
The last point, regarding the existential interpretation, requires some elaboration. I
turn to it in the next two subsections.
2.2. Type-Shifting and Scope
As we have seen, Chierchia and Krifka account for the narrow scope of BPs by
appealing to the locality of type-shifting. The question arises whether locality is
only restricted to those type-shifting operators that result in the existential readings
of BPs (as Chierchia implies), or applies to type-shifting in general.
In order for this account of BPs to be convincing, the locality of type-
shifting ought to be a general phenomenon, not restricted only to BPs. And this
does, indeed, appear to be the case; there is evidence that all type-shifting is local.
Consider negation, for example. Usually, it is scopally ambiguous: (7a) can
mean either (7b) or (7c).
(7) a. John didn’t buy a new coat.
b. John didn’t buy any new coat.
c. There is a new coat that John didn’t buy.
2See Cohen (1999) for my view on the meaning of the generic quantiﬁer.
3Chierchia and Krifka do not, however, agree on the precise nature of the type-shifting operator
involved: for Krifka, this is ∃, whereas for Chierchia it is a special operation of Derived Kind
Predication (DKP). This difference, however, need not concern us here.
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thatisread dedicto:(8a)can onlymean (8b); itdoesnotget thereading paraphrased
by (8c).4
(8) a. John needed but didn’t buy a new coat.
b. John needed a new coat but didn’t buy any new coat.
c. John needed a new coat but there is a new coat that John didn’t buy.
In the case of 8a, then, negation is not ambiguous: it must get wide scope.
Why?
Thereasonhas towiththefact thatbuy isshiftedtothetypeofan intensional
verb if conjoined with need (Partee and Rooth 1983):
(9) SHIFT(buy)=λQ.λx.Q(λy.buy(x,y))
Now, we can shift the verb, and then negate the result: ¬SHIFT(buy).T h e n w e
get:
(10) ¬∃x(new-coat(x)∧buy(j,x))
However, apparently we cannot negate the verb ﬁrst and then type-shift, i.e.
we cannot have SHIFT(¬buy).I fw ed i d ,w ew o u l dg e t :
(11) * ∃x(new-coat(x)∧¬buy(j,x))
But this reading is not available for (8a).
Hence, there is independent evidence that, in general, type-shiftingis local.5
2.3. Existential Readings and Blocking
Why isn’t the existential type-shifting of BPs blocked by the plural existential de-
terminer some? In other words, since English has overt means to provide existential
interpretationsofplurals,whydoesn’tthisfactblocktheapplicationoftype-shifting
to produce the same means?
Chierchia and Krifka are aware of this difﬁculty, and they suggest that some
contributes more information than simply an existential quantiﬁer: speciﬁcally, that
some introduces a choice function. Hence, the interpretations of some dogs and
the existential interpretation of the BP dogs are not the same, and consequently the
former does not block the latter.
Some evidence that this is what some does, and that it does not act simply
as a determiner (unlike the singular a/an), comes from the fact that it cannot intro-
duce a variable to be bound by an adverbial quantiﬁer. Thus, while (12a) means
(roughly) that most dogs are intelligent, (12b) and (12c) cannot be so understood;
they can only get the bizarre interpretation that there exists some dog (or dogs)
whose intelligence keeps changing as time goes by, but is usually high.
4Of course, (8a) can also be read de re, as saying that there is a new coat that John needed but
didn’t buy; but this reading does not involve type-shifting, and does not concern us here.
5I am not sure why that is so; one possible speculation is that type shifting is a costly operation,
so we prefer to shift as little as possible.
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b. *Some dog is usually intelligent.
c. *Some dogs are usually intelligent.
Thus,thesingulardeterminerablockstheexistentialinterpretationofbaresingulars
in English, while the plural some does not block the existential interpretation of
BPs.
It appears to be possible to generalize this explanation across languages.
Italian, for example, has no plural determiner either, but instead uses the bare parti-
tive dei (Chierchia 1998).
(13)
Dei
of-the
ragazzi
boys
sono arrivati
arrived
in ritardo.
late
‘(Some) boys arrived late’
Being a partitive, the meaning of dei is not simply that of an existential, hence it
does not block the existential reading of BPs, as we will see in Section 5.2 below.
In Spanish too, existential readings of BPs are possible:
(14) Marta compr´ o naranjas (McNally 2004)
‘Marta bought oranges’
Unlike Italian, Spanish does have a plural existential determiner, unos/unas.H o w -
ever, it behaves more like English some than like an indeﬁnite singular. For ex-
ample, it apparently cannot restrict the domain of an adverbial quantiﬁer (Louise
McNally, pc) and there are reasons to believe that, like some, it denotes a choice
function (Palma to appear). Hence, the existence of unos/unas in Spanish does not
block the existential interpretation of the BP.
The situation in French is different: in this language, BPs are not allowed.6
Instead, French uses the indeﬁnite article des.
So, we could suggest that the existential reading of BPs is blocked by this
article.7 One potential problem with this view is that it does not appear to be pos-
sible to bind des NPs by an adverb of quantiﬁcation. The following examples are
from Dobrovie-Sorin (to appear):
(15) a. *Des enfants marchent rarement avant 10 mois.
‘Children rarely walk before the age of 10 months’
b. *Des Indiens meurent en g´ en´ eral jeunes.
‘Indians usually die young’
Thus, it looks that, just like some in English, des is not really a determiner,
hence it should not block existential type-shifting. However, the impression created
by the sentences in (15) may be misleading. Dobrovie-Sorin (to appear) points
6Except for a few special circumstances, such as predicative structures, coordination, and
enumerations.
7And, incidentally, the generic reading is blocked by the deﬁnite article, just like in Italian, see
Section 5.
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individuals, they do allow quantiﬁcation over plural individuals:
(16) a. Des pays limitrophes ont souvent des rapports difﬁciles.
‘Neighboring countries frequently have difﬁcult relations’
b. Des amis intimes se critiquent toujours.
‘Intimate friends always criticize each other’
Sentence (16a) does not quantify over individual countries, but over groups of
neighboring countries; and (16b) only makes sense if quantifying over groups of
friends. In such cases, des NPs can, in fact, restrict the domain of a quantiﬁca-
tional adverb. Hence, des is a real determiner, and is, therefore, able to block the
existential type-shift of BPs in French.
3. Between Kinds and Properties
3.1. An Additional Point of Agreement
ChierchiaandKrifkaagree ononeotherpoint: inbothcharacterizing andexistential
readings, the denotation of BPs is the same, though it may later be type-shifted to
an existentially or generically quantiﬁed variable. However, they disagree on what
the denotation of BPs is.
According to Chierchia, BPs denote kinds. For example, the BP dogs de-
notes the kind ∩DOGS, which is a function from each world to the maximal plural-
ity of dogs in that world: λs ιDOGSs.
In contrast, for KrifkaBPs are simply(plural)properties. Thus, themeaning
of the BP dogs is the property DOGS. Let us look brieﬂy at some of the arguments
that Chierchia and Krifka present for their respective views.
3.2. Two Arguments for Kinds
3.2.1. Bare Singulars
Bare singular count nouns are not allowed in either direct kind predication, charac-
terizing, or existential sentences:
(17) a. *Dog is extinct.
b. *Dog is intelligent.
c. *Dog is barking.
According to Chierchia, all these cases require type-shifting to kinds. According to
histheory,thisis possibleonlywithcumulative(pluraland mass)properties, but not
with singular properties. Hence, the unacceptability of the sentences in (17) is used
to argue that the acceptable corresponding sentences with BPs involve reference to
kinds.
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generic reading: direct kind predication and characterizing generics.
However, with the existential reading there is an alternative, simpler expla-
nation: the existential reading of bare singulars is blocked by the indeﬁnite existen-
tial determiner, a/an.
This explanation accounts for the fact, noted by Chierchia, that there are
no languages that allow bare singulars but not bare plurals. The reason is that
there are no languages with a plural indeﬁnite determiner but no singular indeﬁnite
determiner.
3.2.2. Scopally Ambiguous BPs
As we have seen above, existential BPs are restricted to narrow scope only. But
Chierchia, followingCarlson (1977), claims that this is the case only if the BPs may
refer tokinds. BPs that cannotbeinterpretedas kinddenotingare ambiguous. Thus,
for example, the BP parts of that machine cannot plausibly be seen as denoting a
kind. Hence, (18a) is ambiguous, and can mean either (18b) or (18c).
(18) a. John didn’t see parts of that machine.
b. John didn’t see any parts of that machine.
c. There are parts of that machine that John didn’t see.
Again, there is an alternative explanation that does not require kind refer-
ence. It may well be the case that BPs like parts of that machine cannot denote
kinds. However, this is not what allows them to receive wide scope. This comes
about because they can get a speciﬁc interpretation.
The problematic BPs mentioned by Chierchia are boys sitting here, peo-
ple in the next room,a n dparts of that machine. These BPs plausibly do not denote
kinds. But they also, intuitively,talk about a speciﬁc group of individuals,restricted
in time and space. So, in general, it is not easy to distinguish which characteristic
(the inability to denote kinds or the possibility of a speciﬁc interpretation) is re-
sponsible for the scopally ambiguous reading.
However, consider this example from Geurts (to appear):
(19) Several students reported that they had been harassed by professors wearing
false beards and pink gowns.
This sentence certainly has a reading, probably the preferred reading, where the
same professors harassed all the students. Clearly, it is possible to conceive of a
speciﬁc group of professors wearing false beards and pink gowns. But does this BP
fail to denote a kind? Arguably, we can talk about the kind professors wearing false
beards and pink gowns,a si n :
(20) Professors wearing falsebeards and pink gownsgrow morenumerous as one
gets closer to the area where the alien virus was released.
Hence, it appears that what is crucial about such examples is, indeed, speciﬁcity,
and not the inability to denote kinds.
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Krifka agrees that in cases of direct kind predication, the BP denotes a kind, after
an application of the ∩ type-shifting operator. With characterizing and existential
sentences, however, he argues that the type-shift from properties to kinds is not
motivated by type mismatch, hence, by the last resort principle, it shouldn’t occur.
Therefore, Krifka concludes, the BPs in such sentences remain property-denoting,
and are not shifted to kinds.
I believe this argument succeeds with the existential reading. However,
type-shifting is motivated in the case of characterizing generics, for reasons of in-
formation structure.
I take the view that the topic is what the sentence is about (Reinhart 1981,
Erteschik-Shir 1997, and many others). From this, two properties of topics follow.
One is that topics are obligatory—every predicative sentence must have a topic.8
Another is that topics must be speciﬁc: they must denote individuals (singular,
plural, kinds, or whatever).
AsbothChierchiaandKrifka(andmanyothers)agree, thegenericquantiﬁer
is phonologically null. The full implications of this fact, however, are not always
appreciated. If the generic quantiﬁer is phonologically null, this means that it is not
originally “there”, in the sentence. Hence, the “initial” logical form of a generic
like (21) is predicative, not quantiﬁcational.
(21) Dogs are intelligent.
Such a sentence must therefore have a topic. Properties are not speciﬁc,
hence they cannot serve as topics. In contrast, kinds are speciﬁc. Hence, the
property DOGS is type-shifted to the kind ∩DOGS, so that the initial logical form
of (21) is:
(22) intelligent(∩DOGS).
Only at this stage may the generic quantiﬁer be introduced, and the kind
type-shifted back to a property. The resulting logical form is:
(23) genx[∪∩DOGS(x)][intelligent(x)].
Crucially, the topic requirement had to be satisﬁed already at the predica-
tional stage, hence the motivation for the type-shift. Thus, the application of the ∩
type-shifting operator to BPs in characterizing generics is motivated.
8cf. Krifka (2004): “As a general rule of discourse coherence, every sentence must have a topic”
(p. 129).
60 Ariel Cohen4. A Synthesis
4.1. The Theory
Letustakestock. Theargumentsforkindsappeartosucceed onlyforcharacterizing
readings (and, of course, direct kind predication), and theargument for properties—
only for existential readings.
This situation calls for a synthesis of the views of Chierchia and Krifka. I
suggest such a synthesis: I accept their six points of agreement, but, following Co-
hen and Erteschik-Shir (2002, cf. Van Geenhoven 1996, McNally 1998, Dobrovie-
Sorin and Laca 1996, Doron 2003), I suggest that characterizing BPs, like Chier-
chia claims, denote kinds, but existential BPs, like Krifka argues, denote properties.
Thus, the BP dogs in (24a) denotes the kind ∩DOGS= λs ιDOGSs, while in (24b)
it denotes the property DOGS.9
(24) a. Dogs are intelligent.
b. John saw dogs.
The initial logical form of (24a) is:
(25) intelligent(DOGS)
This creates a type mismatch, since the predicate intelligent requires an individual.
We cannot “wait” until the eventual introduction of the generic quantiﬁer to resolve
this mismatch, since this is a predicative sentence, hence requires a topic already at
the predicative stage. Therefore, the BP must be speciﬁc, hence it is type-shifted to
the kind ∩DOGS, and we get:
(26) intelligent(∩DOGS)
This logical form is semantically well formed, but pragmatically odd: it
is not the kind ∩DOGS that is intelligent; only individual dogs can be intelligent.
Hence, the generic quantiﬁer is introduced,10 resulting in:
(27) genx[∪∩DOGS(x)][intelligent(x)].
Theexistentialreading is generated by theapplicationofthe ∃operator. The
initial logical form of (24b) would be:
(28) see(j,DOGS).
This causes a type mismatch, because the second argument of see ought to be an
individual, and not a property. The mismatch is resolved by type-shifting: we apply
∃ to the property λxsee(j,x), and, as desired, we get:
(29) ∃x(DOGS(x)∧see(j,DOGS(x))
9I will not discuss here my view on the reasons why the BP is interpreted generically in (24a)
but existentially in (24b); the interested reader is referred to Cohen and Erteschik-Shir (2002).
10I believe the mechanism responsible for this introduction is pragmatic in nature, and is similar
to Nunberg’s (1995) predicate transfer, but I will not pursue the matter further here.
Between Kinds and Properties: Bare Plurals across Languages 61If we assume that type-shifting occurs as locally as possible, the existential
interpretation receives narrow scope only. For example:
(30) John didn’t see dogs.
The initial logical form of (30) is:
(31) ¬see(j,dogs).
If type-shifting applies locally, we ﬁrst resolve see(j,DOGS), as before. Only then
do we apply negation to the result, to get:
(32) ¬∃x(DOGS(x)∧see(j,DOGS(x))
4.2. The Data
How do we decide the matter empirically? How can we determine, for each of the
two relevant interpretations of a BP (existential and characterizing) whether the BP
in question denotes a kind or a property?
Crucial pieces of evidence would be sentences where one occurrence of a
BP is interpreted in more than one way. For example:
(33) Dodos lived in Mauritius and (they) became extinct in the 18th century. (af-
ter Heyer 1990).
The VP in this sentence consists of two conjoined predicates. The ﬁrst predicate,
lived in Mauritius, forces the BP to receive a characterizing reading. The second
predicate, became extinct in the 18th century, forces it to be interpreted as direct
kind predication. The fact that the sentence is good shows that in both cases, the
BP denotes the same object. Hence, the BP must denote a kind in a characterizing
generic as well as in sentences of direct kind predication.
Another crucial example is the following:
(34) ??Dogsare man’sbest friend and (they)are barkingoutsiderightnow(Schu-
bert and Pelletier 1987).
Again, we have a conjunction of two predicates. The ﬁrst forces a generic interpre-
tation of the BP, while the second forces an existential reading. The fact that this
sentence is bad shows that the BP denotes different objects in each of the readings:
if it denotes a kind in generic sentences, it must denote a property in existential
ones.
If these judgments are granted, the theory presented here is conﬁrmed em-
pirically. However, it turns out that judgments are not so clear. As a matter of
fact, Schubert and Pelletier (1987) present sentence (34) as an example of a good
sentence, and use it to argue that existential BPs do denote kinds.
We must, therefore, look elsewhere for data to resolve the matter. A good
place to look would be a language where BPs cannot denote kinds. Then, if in this
language BPs get a characterizing reading, we would know that reference to kinds
is not necessary for such readings; otherwise, we will conclude that it is. And the
same goes for the existential reading. In the next section I will argue that Italian is
precisely such a language.
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5.1. Direct Kind Predication
Chierchia argues that direct kind predication is possible in Italian. His best exam-
ples are the following:
(35) a. Qui, ragazze in minigonna sono rare.
‘Here, girls in miniskirt are rare’
b. Dopo il disastro nucleare, purtroppo, cani con difetti congeniti sono molto
comuni.
‘After the nuclear disaster, unfortunately, dogs with birth defects are very
common’
However, these examples are not entirely convincing, since rare ‘rare’ and
comuni ‘common’ are arguably better analyzed as quantiﬁcational predicates than
as kind predicates (Krifka et al. 1995). When we test the claim with predicates that
unequivocally require kinds, we ﬁnd that BPs are impossible (Longobardi 2001):
(36) a. *Elefanti di colore bianco sono estinti.
‘White-colored elephants have become extinct’
b. *Elefanti di colore bianco diventano sempre pi` u grandi man mano che si
va a nord
‘White-colored elephants grow larger as one drives north’
c. *Elefanti di colore bianco sono cos` ı chiamati per la pigmentazione della
loro pelle
‘White-colored elephants are so-called because of the pigmentation of
their skin’
We can therefore conclude that direct kind predication is not possible in Italian.11
What is the cause of this difference between Italian and English? Why can’t
BPs denote kinds in Italian? Following Dayal (2004b), I assume that in Italian, the
deﬁnite determiner is ambiguous. Under one reading, it is like in English, denoting
uniqueness (or, rather, maximality). Formally, the NP is translated as ιP, where P
is the denotation of the NP.
The second reading is, in a sense, an “intensional version” of the ﬁrst:
λs ιPs. This is a function from a world to the maximal plurality of Ps in that world.
But note that this second reading of the deﬁnite determiner is precisely Chierchia’s
∩ operator.
Indeed, Italian allows overt type-shifting of BPs to kinds, through the deﬁ-
nite determiner:
(37) Gli elefanti di colore bianco sono estinti (Longobardi 2001)
‘The white-colored elephants have become extinct’
11See also Dayal (2004a), Robinson (2005).
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to a kind, such type-shifting cannot apply covertly. Hence, ∩ cannot apply to Italian
BPs, and therefore they cannot denote kinds.
5.2. Existential Readings
It is uncontroversial that Italian BPs allow existential readings. Moreover, just like
in English, these readings are restricted to narrow scope only. Thus, (38) can only
mean that it is false that there exist beautiful girls whom I met. It cannot get the
interpretation where there exist beautiful girls whom I didn’t meet.
(38) Non ho conosciuto belle ragazze
‘(I) didn’t meet beautiful girls’
Since BPs in Italian cannot refer to kinds, yet they do get existential read-
ings, this is strong evidence that the existential interpretation does not require kind
reference. This is explained if, as with Krifka and the current proposal, existential
BPs denote properties.12
5.3. Characterizing Generics
Characterizing generic BPs are bad in Italian:
(39) a. *Linguisti sono bravi (Chierchia 1998)
‘Linguists are clever’
b. ??Cani da guardia di grosse dimensioni sono pi` u pelosi/neri (Longobardi
2001)
‘Watchdogs of large size are hairier/blacker’
Again, since Italian BPs cannot denote kinds, this provides evidence for the view
that characterizing readings do require kind reference. This is compatible with
Chierchia and the current proposal.
5.4. And Therefore...
So, in accordance with the proposed synthesis: characterizing, but not existential
readings of BPs, require reference to kinds.
It wouldseemthat thisisan appropriatepointto ﬁnishthepaper, anddeclare
the debate settled. However, there is a ﬂy in the ointment.
Despitethefact that Italian BPs do not denotekinds, characterizing readings
of BPs do appear to be possible in some cases:
12See also McNally (2004) for arguments that in Spanish, existential BPs denote properties too.
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bardi 2001).
‘Watchdogs of large size are more efﬁcient/aggressive.’
Now, not all speakers of Italian agree that (40) is good; but quite a few do. Hence,
we cannot ignore such examples, and need to provide some principled explanation
for them.
Let us ﬁrst get one red herring out of the way. The subject of (40) is rather
“heavy”; could this be the reason why the sentence is good?
The answer is no. The heaviness requirements for subjects is not related
to the possibility of a characterizing interpretation. First, we have already seen,
with sentence (39b), an example of a sentence with a heavy subject BPs, that can-
not get a generic interpretation nonetheless. Second, the heaviness requirement of
Italian subject BPs applies even when they are interpreted existentially. For exam-
ple, Chierchia points out that the sentences in (41) are bad; but when the subject
becomes heavy, as in (42), the sentences become considerably better.
(41) a.
*Studenti
students
hanno
have
telefonato.
phoned
b.
*Hanno
have
telefonato
phoned
studenti.
students
‘Students have phoned’
(42) a.
Studenti
students
e
and
colleghi
colleagues
hanno
have
telefonato.
phoned
‘Students and colleagues have phoned’
b.
Hanno
have
telefonato
phoned
studenti
students
che
that
volevano
want
sapere
to ﬁnd out
la
the
data
date
dell’esame
of the exam
‘Students who want to ﬁnd out the date of the exam have phoned’
I am not aware of a completely satisfactory explanation of the heaviness
requirements of subject BPs; but whatever the reason is, it is clear that this require-
ment is orthogonal to the generic interpretation of the BP.
How, then, can we explain sentences like (40)? The way to do so, I suggest,
is to look at an additional use of BPs.
6. Rules and Regulations
In English, a BP can be used in a characterizing generic, i.e. it can be interpreted as
makinga descriptivegeneralization. But it can also also make astatement that some
rule or regulation is in effect (Cohen 2001, cf. Carlson 1995, Greenberg 2003).
Take, for example, sentence (43), from de Swart (1996).
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This sentence can make a statement about how police ofﬁcers behave (or, rather,
fail to behave) in emergency situations. It could, for example, be said by a reporter
who is writing a piece about the police force.
But (43) also has another use. It could, for instance, be uttered by the chief
of police, who is expressing outrage at the way the ofﬁcers behaved in some in-
cident. Under this use, the speaker does not describe the way police ofﬁcers do
actually behave, but rather how they ought to behave: the speaker describes some
rule or regulation that police ofﬁcers ought to abide by.
An importanttype of the rule-or-regulation use is one that can be interpreted
as a trigger for some speciﬁc action. For example, the most plausible interpretation
of (44) is the rule-or-regulation reading: because a certain norm exists, a certain
action ought to be triggered.
(44) Police ofﬁcers do not behave like that in an emergency situation, therefore
stop that immediately!
Some authors believe that rule-or-regulation sentences are characterizing
generics. However, there is evidence that this is not the case; and that in such
sentences the BP denotes a property (like it does under the existential reading) and
not a kind (like in a characterizing generic).
Onepieceofevidenceinvolvesindeﬁnitesingulars. Indeﬁnitesingularsmay
receive the action-trigger reading, even when they can’t get a descriptive, charac-
terizing reading. For example, take the following sentence, from Burton-Roberts
(1977):
(45) A gentleman opens doors for ladies.
Burton-Roberts (1977) note that (45) could be used to get the hearer to open doors
for ladies, hence it can be used as an action trigger. It can also be read as a deﬁnition
of what a gentleman is—a deﬁnition is another type or a rule or regulation. Cru-
cially, however, (45) cannot be interpreted as a generalization about the observed
behavior of gentlemen. If the rule-or-regulation is just one use of the characterizing
reading, how can (45) get the former reading if it can’t get the latter?
Another piece of evidence comes from action triggers in French. As men-
tionedabove, inthislanguageBPs arealmostneverallowed. Genericreadings(both
direct kind predication and characterizing generics) are indicated with the deﬁnite
determiner les. Existentialreadings are indicated with the indeﬁnitedeterminer des.
Interestingly, rules-or-regulation sentences are expressed with the indeﬁnite
determiner, notthedeﬁnitedeterminer(Carlier1989, asreported bydeSwart 1996).
Thus, a reporter writing about the police force would say (46a), whereas the chief
of police, chastising some ofﬁcers, would say (46b).
(46) a. Lesagentsdepolicenesecomportentpasainsidansunesituationd’alarme.
‘DEF-PL police ofﬁcers do not behave like that in an emergency situa-
tion.’
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‘INDEF-PL police ofﬁcers do not behave like that in an emergency situa-
tion.’
So, rule-or-regulation sentences are indicated with the indeﬁnite determiner, which
is used for the existential reading, rather than the deﬁnite determiner, which is used
for the generic reading.
I would like to make the following claim: what appear to be good charac-
terizing generics in Italian are, in fact, rule-or-regulation sentences. Speciﬁcally,
they are action triggers. Let me exemplify this claim with some minimal pairs from
Longobardi (2001):
(47) a. Canidaguardiadigrossedimensionisonopi` uefﬁcienti/aggressivi(perquesto
evitare Fido!)
‘Watchdogs of large size are more efﬁcient/aggressive (therefore avoid
Fido!)’
b. ??Cani daguardiadigrossedimensionisonopi` upelosi/neri(perquesto...???)
‘Watchdogs of large size are hairier/blacker (therefore...???)’
(48) a. Stati di grandi dimensioni sono pericolosi (perquesto attaccateli!)
‘States of large size are dangerous (therefore attack them!)’
b. ??Stati di grandi dimensioni sono prosperi (perquesto...???)
‘States of large size are prosperous (therefore...???)’
(49) a. Uccelli di zone paludose sono ghiotti di insetti (perquesto date a Tweety
degli insetti!).
‘Birds from marshy areas are greedy for insects (therefore feed Tweety
some insects!)’
b. ??Uccelli di zone paludose sono scuri/intelligenti (perquesto...???)
‘Birds from marshy areas are dark/intelligent (therefore...???)’
Sentence (47a) is good, because the efﬁciency or aggressiveness of watchdogs can
be readily interpreted as triggering some speciﬁc actions, probably avoiding them.
However, it is not so clear what action is triggered by the hairiness of watchdogs or
their color, hence (47b) is not so good.
Similarly,(48a) isﬁne, because ifastateisdangerous, somespeciﬁccourses
of action can be readily triggered. But if a state is prosperous, no course of action
immediately suggests itself. And if a bird likes insects, the obvious action is to feed
it; but if it is dark or intelligent, how would this affect our actions?13
Hence, what appears to be a characterizing BP in Italian is actually the
action-triggering reading. Since under this reading the BP denotes a property rather
than a kind, such examples do not constitute counterexamples to the theory de-
veloped here, according to which kind reference is necessary for characterizing
generics.
13Longobardi (2001) notes that the good sentence are “somewhat more eventive” than the bad
ones. This intuition is quite compatible with the idea that the good sentences are action triggers.
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The theory proposed here provides a uniform account of the similarities and differ-
ences in the behavior of BPs in two languages, English and Italian. In both of these
languages, BPs originally denote properties.
These properties can be type-shifted by ∃ to receive existential readings;
since type-shifting is local, these readings receive narrow scope only.
Alternatively, these properties can be interpreted as being a part of a rule
or a regulation; in this case we get what looks like a characterizing generic, but, in
fact, is not.
In English, there is a third option: the BP can be type-shifted by ∩ to a
kind, to receive a generic reading: either direct kind predication or a characterizing
generic. In Italian, this option is disallowed by the blocking principle: the overt
deﬁnite determiner can do the same job.
Hence, in both languages, and perhaps universally, BPs are properties sub-
ject to constrained type-shifting.
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